Several recent articles have reached different conclusions regarding the impact of the religioussecular cleavage in Chile. The resolution of this debate has important consequences for the understanding of cleavages. Studies subscribing to the view that parties have considerable agency in the maintenance of cleavages have found that religiosity no longer affects vote choice, while studies rooted in a sociological perspective argue that religiosity still matters. We show that the reason for the discrepant results is because a partisan realignment is underway, whereby religious voters are gradually shifting their loyalties from the parties of the left to the parties of the right, matching a division that has taken place at the elite level. These results are consistent with an issue evolution perspective, which provides a clearer articulation of how cleavages form than both the agency or sociological approaches.
, however, represent the view that the number and types of political cleavages are determined primarily by party elites, and not necessarily by the number of social cleavages.
In this view, the agency of political parties explains the sudden demise from the religious-secular cleavage and the emergence of the authoritarian-democratic divide.
In an effort to resolve these controversies, we re-examine the Chilean case. Drawing from the theories of issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Carmines and Woods, 2002) and conflict extension (Layman and Carsey, 2002) , our analyses show that a partisan realignment is underway in Chile whereby voters have formed partisan identities that match how religioussecular issues have evolved at the elite level. These results provide evidence that parties have considerable agency in creating and maintaining cleavages (in keeping with Torcal and Mainwaring) . However, these results also suggest that the issues which perennially animate party politics-those rooted in the social cleavage structure of society-appear to be permanent features of electoral politics, even if the parties which benefit from certain social groups' support changes over time (as Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma contend) .
Religiosity and the Role of Parties in Chilean Politics
A long line of literature has examined the role of cleavages in the formation of party systems. This literature can be divided into three strands. The classic formulation maintains that party systems "froze" around the major social cleavages in society shortly after the extension of universal (male) suffrage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970 ; see also LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Rose, 1974; Lipset, 1960) . This literature is often referred to as a sociological approach because it assumes that parties are extensions of the social group bases they purport to represent. A second line of literature understands cleavages as consisting of three components: the social structure, the values associated with each social category, and the political articulation of these values (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Bartolini, 2000; Knutsen and Scarbrough, 1995; Kriesi, 1998) . This second line of literature sees party systems as being rooted in the social cleavage structure of society, yet acknowledges some autonomy for political parties in the creation and maintenance of these cleavages: without parties to articulate political divisions, social groups and the values associated with them would not be represented. Finally, a third line of literature views parties as possessing even greater agency over the formation of cleavages, emphasizing the agency of parties in creating the cleavages among voters that meet with their electoral and legislative strategies vis-à-vis the other parties (Schattschneider, 1960; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Sartori, 1969; Chhibber and Torcal, 1997; Enyedi, 2005) . Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) discuss these three strands of literature as we do above.
However, their argument fundamentally divides the literature into two. One side (primarily, the sociological approach) emphasizes the importance of the mass electorate in the formation of cleavages, assuming that political parties represent the interests of objective social group identities. This literature also assumes that party systems are shaped primarily by the social structure of society (perhaps a consequence of the mass party model popular at the time during which many of the major works were written). The other side-including the position taken by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) -de-emphasizes the role of the electorate. Instead, the position taken by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) is that cleavages do not form without party elite efforts to create them. This latter position is in keeping with previous research on the weak, unstable relationships between social cleavages and parties in many Latin American countries (Dix, 1989; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995) .
The case of Chile exemplifies this debate. While Chile is well-known for having stable class and religious cleavages (Scully, 1992; ibid, 1995; Huneeus, 2003; Walker, 2003) , recent research contends that these two cleavages have been supplanted. Spearheading this new consensus, Torcal and Mainwaring-building upon the earlier work of Tironi and Agüero (1999) and Tironi (2002) -contend that "religion [has become] irrelevant as a predictor of party preference in contemporary Chile," (2003, 83) . They argue that in the wake of the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet's rule, the political parties of Concertación broke with the party system of 1973 (the last year under democracy prior to Pinochet's coup) and disarticulated religious and class issues in an effort to present a united pro-democracy front against the two major parties that supported Pinochet, UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente) and RN (Renovación Nacional). As a result of this disarticulation of religious and class interests, most variables associated with religion and class no longer predict party preferences; in their place, they argue that a political cleavage on the issue of regime preference has supplanted these social cleavage effects. Key to their argument is the role that the political parties have played in creating and sustaining the regime preference cleavage, while at the same time de-emphasizing the religious and class cleavages. Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) stand in sharp contrast to this new consensus.
Rooting their argument in the sociological perspective that emphasizes the role of the electorate in the formation of cleavages, they contend that religiosity and religious issues continue to shape party preferences in Chile, noting that unlike religion, regime preferences do not have competing organizations that advocate the position of each respective side. Because of the shallow roots of the regime divide (in comparison to those of the more traditional cleavages of religion and class), the regime cleavage is viewed as "incidental" (Valenzuela, 1997, 51-52) , or not having effects that are as long-term as social cleavages. According to this view, religious and other important social cleavages have not been displaced by or subsumed under a regime preference cleavage.
Rather, these cleavages affect partisan attitudes toward Pinochet in the same way that they affect current regime and party preferences. This is in keeping with the view that the social cleavage makeup of society plays a determinative role in the formation of cleavages.
One major shortcoming of previous studies that has impeded resolution of this debate with regard to the Chilean case is that most studies have examined party preferences at one time point. For instance, Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) conclude that religiosity no longer affects party preferences on the basis of data from one point in time. For their part, Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) showing religiosity effects are due to the fact that they examine a different time period, use a different measure of religiosity, or both. Without a broader time horizon, previous studies have been unable to recognize that the reason for the discrepant findings is that a partisan realignment along religious-secular lines is underway in Chile. In the next section, we articulate why such a realignment has occurred.
An Issue Evolution Perspective of the Chilean Case
The arguments in Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) toward cleavage realignment are akin to the notion of conflict displacement in the American politics literature (Schattschneider, 1960; Sundquist, 1983) . Conflict displacement maintains that realignments are characterized by the total replacement of one partisan conflict with another. In the immediate aftermath of the plebiscite on Pinochet's rule, Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) maintain that the previous bases of Chilean politics-religion and class-became irrelevant, being displaced by a cleavage dividing supporters of authoritarian rule (under Pinochet and in general) from supporters of democracy.
Conflict displacement has fallen out of favor and given way to the theories of issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Carmines and Woods, 2002) and conflict extension (Layman and Carsey, 2002) . The theory of issue evolution holds that rather than producing sharp, abrupt changes in people's partisan preferences, new issues emerge progressively and produce partisan realignments over time. The process begins at a critical moment when party elites start to differentiate themselves from one another on a particular issue, eventually leading them to take clear and consistent stances on similar issues that distinguish them from other parties. Activists both inside and outside the party transmit these stances via cues linking the issue(s) to the parties in such a way that can be perceived by the electorate. The electorate, in turn, perceives these distinctions and begins to polarize in ways that mirror the parties' polarized stances, both in terms of partisanship and issue positions/ideology. We also see evidence of elite polarization with regard to other religious issues, including the legalization of divorce (Tironi and Agüero, 1999, 157-62) , sex education, and emergency contraception (Guzmán, Seibert, and Staab, 2010) , all of which passed with the support of Concertación. The parties of the Alliance responded by representing conservative, religious views on each of these issues. Activists on both sides (women's rights groups in favor of Concertación's policies, priests and other religious leaders opposed) spoke out on both sides of the issues (Guzmán, Seibert, and Staab, 2010) , playing the role of party activists, linking the laws to the distinct positions each party has adopted (see Carmines and Stimson, 1989, chapter 4) . As these and other religious issues have evolved into an axis of partisan competition at the elite and activist levels, an issue evolution perspective predicts that voters have followed the lead of parties, with party identification dividing increasingly along religious-secular lines.
This polarization among elites began during the early-to-mid 1990s, during which the PS and PPD members of Concertación came into greater prominence, both as a result of winning higher offices, but also by promoting an increasingly secular agenda in Congress. This . This transition from elite-to-mass polarization has occurred over roughly the same amount of time as race issues evolved in the U.S. Congress before polarizing the electorate (see Carmines and Stimson, 1989) .
While Carmines and Stimson (1989) has long been present in Chilean politics (Scully, 1992) . All that has changed since democratization are the social bases of party identification. Campbell et al., 1960, 24-32; Dalton, 2006, 178; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, 23) . It is because of this long-term stability that Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) and others refer to religion and other social cleavages as partygenerative: these issues are capable of producing long-standing party identification because the social identities which give rise to such issues are equally long-lived. Furthermore, this is in keeping with the most important fact underlying arguments made by those like Lipset and Rokkan (1967) . Although realignments appear to contradict the freezing hypothesis, the sorts of issues which fundamentally drive party politics-those rooted in people's lasting social group identities-remain constant features, even if the party beneficiaries of particular groups' support changes.
With the case of regime preference in Chile, the parties that would form Concertación recognized the issue of democracy divided public support for the parties of the Alliance enough that they could win control of government by emphasizing this issue. As a result of their initial success, issue evolution theory suggests that Concertación will continue to use the issue to their advantage until it no longer commands the attention of voters. It is because this issue is only rooted in the experiences of those who lived during the Pinochet years-and is not rooted in the deeper social identities of voters-that Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) Thus, in all of this one can see that issue evolution provides a clearer explanation of the formation of cleavages than the theory offered by Torcal and Mainwaring. This is because issue evolution and its counterpart, conflict extension, incorporate both the role of parties and the mass electorate. According to this issue evolution explanation, as Concertación began to promote more secular policies while in government-and the Alliance began to identify themselves more with religious issues-we should find evidence of realignment between the two coalitions, whereby identification with the two coalitions increasingly divides along religious-secular lines.
Data Analyses
In the data analyses to follow, we present four sets of analyses designed to test whether religiosity has re-emerged as a significant political division, as an issue evolution perspective predicts. First, we re-examine the possibility that if the two major coalitions have become increasingly divided along religious-secular lines, this should be apparent in individual perceptions of the parties' positions on issues of morality. Second, we examine the divide between the two major party coalitions for evidence of realignment, whether identification with each coalition is divided increasingly along religious-secular lines. A third section tests whether an issue of morality (legalization of divorce)-which became a major political issue in the mid 1990s-served as a 'critical moment' (Carmines and Stimson, 1989 ) that began to polarize party identification. Finally, a fourth analysis examines whether the religious-secular divide has been displaced by the regime preference cleavage-as Tironi (2002) and Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) maintain-or whether both sets of issues impact party identification (as conflict extension and issue evolution perspectives maintain).
Perceptions of the Parties on Issues of Morality
If there has been realignment along religious-secular lines in Chile, there should be observable evidence of divergence in perceptions of the political parties' positions on issues of morality that divide religious and secular individuals. The literature review above suggests that party rhetoric on issues like divorce, abortion, etc. increasingly divides the parties. While it would be ideal to observe changes in party perceptions over time, temporal data on party perceptions are not readily available. Fortunately, however, one survey conducted jointly by the Centro de Estudios Públicos, Chile (CEP) and the Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) in 2008 asks respondents about their perceptions of the parties' positions (in addition to respondents' own positions) on three issues of morality: abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage, all arranged on a scale from one (most religious-complete disapproval of the behavior) to ten (most secular-complete acceptance). Because this survey is conducted toward the end of the period in which we argue that religious-secular issues have polarized, examining respondents' views of the parties' positions on these three issues tests whether the parties have indeed polarized along religious-secular lines, as an issue evolution perspective predicts.
These perceptions are presented in Table 1 . On each issue, respondents view PS and PPD as being the most secular, while they perceive UDI as being the most religious (with RN and PDC also emerging as more religious than PS and PPD). Comparing the two electoral alliances, Concertación is perceived to be significantly more secular than the Alliance (as determined by difference-of-means tests), and closer to respondents' perceptions of PS and PPD.
While perceptions of PDC emerge as closer to perceptions of the Alliance than perceptions of Concertación, this is actually quite indicative of realignment along issue evolution lines.
Specifically, this suggests that as Concertación has adopted the policies of its more secular member parties, the electorate has come to identify it as representative of the more secular positions taken by PS and PPD instead of the more religious positions historically taken by PDC.
In other words, while the religious realignment has left perceptions of PDC potentially unchanged, the important finding in Table 1 is that contemporary perceptions of Concertación on issues of morality reflect the positions taken by PS and PPD, which is in line with an issue evolution perspective suggesting realignment along religious-secular lines is underway in Chile.
Table 1 about here
Comparing the distance between the average respondent and each electoral bloc's position may explain why the Alliance has adopted increasingly religious positions. On both abortion and same-sex marriage (though not euthanasia), the average perception of the Alliance is closer to the average respondent than perceptions of Concertación. This suggests that the parties of the Alliance have adopted such positions because they more closely represent Chileans than the more secular PS and PPD and thus, these stances may have helped to propel the Alliance to victory in 2010 (particularly on the increasingly prominent issue of same-sex marriage).
These findings are consistent with an issue evolution perspective. As the party elites belonging to the parties comprising Concertación have become increasingly vocal in support of secular issues-and elites belonging to the parties of the Alliance increasingly supportive of religious issues-the public has increasingly come to recognize that the parties of each coalition represent increasingly distinct positions with regard to religious and secular issues. These findings apply not only to the individual parties, but to perceptions of Concertación and the Alliance as well. In sum, these findings suggest that as the parties belonging to Concertación (particularly PS) have come to be identified with secular positions, and as parties of the Alliance have come to be identified with religious positions on issues of morality, the support bases of the parties should have similarly divided increasingly along religious-secular lines.
Re-examining The Divide Between the Alliance and Concertación
In this section, we examine the division in party identification between Concertación (coded one) and the Alliance (coded zero). While the question wording varies slightly from one survey to the next, the question generally reads: 'Now, out of the following political tendencies, with which do you identify or sympathize most?' (the authors' own English translation). Mainwaring (2003) showing that religiosity is not significantly associated with party identification, these results suggest that a realignment along religious-secular lines is underway in Chile.
The bottom of Table 2 reports the predicted probability changes when moving from half a standard deviation below the mean to half a standard deviation above the mean of religiosity.
These were generated using the 'prchange' command developed by Long and Freese (see Long and Freese, 2006) , holding all other independent variables at their mean values (modes in the case of dichotomous variables). Over time, the substantive effect of religiosity has increased substantially. In 1999, the effect of religiosity leads to a three percent decrease in identification 
A Critical Moment? The Case of the Divorce Legalization Debates
In this section, we present results suggesting that part of the reason for the realignment documented in Table 2 is due to 'critical moments' like the divorce legalization debates, which brought about a visible religious-secular division among elites. The bill that legalized divorce in 2004 was initially introduced in November 1995, well before religiosity became significantly associated with support for the Alliance. We test whether this issue served as a critical moment that led to elite polarization along religious-secular lines in a manner similar to the effects that early civil rights legislation had on elite polarization on racial issues in the United States (Carmines and Stimson, 1989) ; we test this by examining whether the impact of attitudes toward divorce on party identification mirrors the evolution of the issue at the elite level. According to an issue evolution perspective, opposition to divorce should become associated with identification with the Alliance as time progresses and the increasingly polarized positions of the parties become more visible.
We investigate this possibility with data from three time points: May-June 1995 (CEP study 30, prior to the introduction of the bill to legalize divorce and the elite discussion surrounding the issue began to intensify), September-October 1999 (CEP study 38), and
December-January 2001-2 (the latter two surveys being the next surveys to ask respondents about their opinions on divorce). The dependent variable is the same as in Table 2 . As above, the data are weighted to correct for sampling biases. To measure the impact of divorce attitudes, we code those reporting that they would never support divorce as one, while those reporting that they would support the legalization of divorce in some cases and those reporting that they do not know are coded as zero.
The models for 1999 and 2001-2 include the same set of variables included in Table 2 above. For the model using data from 1995, however, a number of the independent variables have different measurements from those in Table 2 . Instead of income, which was not asked in 1995, we employ four dichotomous variables measuring four of the five socioeconomic categories surveyed (the lowest class, E, is used as the base category). Education is measured as years of education, ranging from zero (no education) to seven (18 years or more) in one-unit intervals. Finally, age was measured in five age groups, ranging from 18-24 to 55 and older; we treat those aged 18-24 as the base category and include four dummy variables for each of the other four age groups. In keeping with the issue evolution perspective, these results demonstrate that 'critical moments' like the debate over the legalization of divorce appear to have spurred the religious swing toward the Alliance and the secular swing toward Concertación observed in Table 2 .
Although opposition to divorce is significantly associated with Concertación identification in 1995, as time progresses and religious and secular individuals learn about the positions taken by the two blocs, opposition to divorce becomes negatively associated with Concertación identification. Beginning as the single issue of divorce, the coalitions would divide along similar religious-secular lines when faced with other, comparable moral issues like abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage (according to the results in Table 1 ). This transformation from a single issue to a broader religious-secular divide can be seen in Table 3 : as the effect of opposition to divorce becomes insignificant and negative, the effect of attendance also becomes negative, reaching statistical significance by 2001-2.
Evidence of Conflict Extension
In this section, we test whether the impact of the religious-secular divide on party identification is robust when examined against the regime preference cleavage, which some have argued has displaced the religious cleavage (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Tironi, 2002; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003) . To do this, we re-estimate the 2009 CEP data used in model 4 of Table 2 above by separately adding three variables measuring the regime preference cleavage. One variable measures how well respondents believe democracy functions. This is measured from zero (very badly) to four (very well). The second variable is a dichotomous variable coded one for those who felt that 'sometimes an authoritarian government may be preferable' (to democracy), and zero for those responding that 'democracy is preferable to other forms of government,' that democracy and authoritarianism are about the same, and those who did not know which of the three statements best described their opinion. A third variable treated the responses used to code the second variable as a scale ranging from zero (those responding with don't know or that democracy is always preferable) to two (those saying that authoritarian government is sometimes preferable), with those saying that the two forms of government are equivalent coded one. Each model uses the same Concertación/Alliance dependent variable used above and is estimated with logistic regression with the appropriate sample weighting procedure. (Campbell et al., 1960, 24-32; Dalton, 2006, 178; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, 23) : because regime preferences are more short-term issue divides, unlike the more stable social identities that religiosity produces (Valenzuela, 1997, 51-52; Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma, 2007) , regime preferences are more proximate to the development of psychological attachments to the parties (that is, party identification) and should, therefore, have a larger effect on party identification. Based on this, if we were to include variables measuring issues that divide religious and secular individuals alongside regime preferences, the effects of religioussecular issues on party identification would match the effects of regime preferences. Table 1 (in analyses not reported here), Concertación identification is lower when the party is perceived as being more secular on the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage. (The same is true of PS and PPD perceptions.) The substantive effects are not only significant, but also equivalent to-or greater than those of regime preference. See the supplementary file for these results.
These findings provide clear evidence supporting a conflict extension perspective.
Rather than displacing religious issues as previous authors have argued, issues of regime preference coexist alongside religious issues. Based on these results, the reason why religiosity was not significantly associated with party support in earlier periods, while the regime preference
cleavage was, appears to be due to the fact that the effect of religiosity is undergoing a realignment that is only beginning to surface. According to an issue evolution perspective, the reason for the disappearance and reemergence of religious partisan divisions in Chile is because the Chilean party system is undergoing realignment along religious and secular lines. The analyses presented above demonstrate that since the late 1990s Concertación has increasingly drawn support from seculars, while the Alliance has increasingly drawn from religious individuals. Since democratization, and particularly under the two socialist presidencies, party elites have polarized along religioussecular lines; in response, party identification has polarized at the mass level as well. This is in keeping with the theory of issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Carmines and Woods, 2002) . Although an issue cleavage based on regime preferences has also emerged during this period, the religious-secular cleavage is also salient; the existence of both religious and regime cleavages is explained by conflict extension (Layman and Carsey, 2002) , which is in keeping with issue evolution theory.
Conclusion
The argument put forth here, based upon the theories of issue evolution and conflict extension, provides an explanation that may resolve the debate between those like Torcal and
Mainwaring (2003) and Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007) , and therefore may resolve the dispute within social cleavage theory regarding the roles of parties and the electorate. A reevaluation of the Chilean case from an issue evolution perspective shows that the agency of political parties is essential to understanding which cleavages emerge (as those like Torcal and
Mainwaring contend), but that party systems ultimately reflect the social cleavage structure of society (as those like Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma counter), thereby constraining the choices available to parties as to which cleavages-social or political-they may elect to create and represent. Although arguments rooted in the notion of party agency contradict the part of the Lipset and Rokkan freezing hypothesis that predicts sustained patterns of social group support for the same parties over time, what remains truly frozen are the issues rooted in prominent social group identities: whether represented by one party or another, these issues remain permanent features of electoral politics. This shows that by appealing to issue evolution and conflict extension, social cleavage explanations are able to incorporate the valuable insights regarding party competition provided by those like Torcal and Mainwaring, but in ways that are in keeping with the original understandings of social cleavage theory. two-tailed) . Entries in the top section of the table are log odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Entries in the bottom section of the table reflect the change in probability of supporting each respective party in a given year when moving from one half a standard deviation below to one half a standard deviation above the mean of religiosity, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values (standard deviations of the predicted probabilities are in parentheses). (two-tailed) . Entries in the top section of the table are log odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Entries in the bottom section of the table reflect the change in probability of supporting each respective party in a given year when moving from one half a standard deviation below to one half a standard deviation above the mean of religiosity, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values. 
Supplementary Material
We address two issues in this supplementary file. One issue is concerned with the robustness of the findings in the main text showing that the religious-secular cleavage has reemerged as an important issue cleavage in Chilean politics. A second issue regards the use of alternative measures of age-related effects. We deal with each sequentially below.
Because some have argued that the regime preference cleavage has displaced the religious cleavage (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Tironi, 2002; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003) , we demonstrate that the impact of religious issues on party identification appears robust when examined against the regime preference cleavage (as we claim in footnote 5 in the main text).
To do this, we use the 2008 CEP/PNUD survey used in Table 2 in the main text, which included measures of party placements on three issues of morality: abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage. For each issue, we create an issue-distance measure by taking the absolute distance between respondents and their perceptions of the party's position. In Table S .1, we use perceptions of Concertación in order to test whether it is the increasingly secular positions taking by Concertación on such issues that have driven the polarization in party perceptions and party identification among the mass public. In Table S .5, we compare the results using Concertación perceptions with the results using other party perceptions.
We include four controls measuring the regime preference cleavage. One variable measures how well respondents believe democracy functions. This is measured from zero (very well) to four (very badly). The next two variables measure preferences for authoritarianism.
The first is a dichotomous variable coded one for those who felt that 'sometimes an authoritarian government may be preferable' (to democracy), and zero for those responding that 'democracy is preferable to other forms of government', that democracy and authoritarianism are about the same, and those who did not know which of the three statements best described their opinion. A third variable treated these responses as a scale ranging from zero (those responding with 'don't know' or that democracy is always preferable) to two (those saying that authoritarian government is sometimes preferable), with those saying that the two forms of government are equivalent coded one. Finally, a fourth variable asks respondents about their perceptions of the current quality of democracy using a scale ranging from zero (very democratic) to nine (not democratic).
In Table S .1, each regime preference variable is added separately to the three morality perception variables. All four models use the Concertación/Alliance dependent variable and are estimated with logistic regression with the appropriate sample weighting procedure.
Table S.1 about here
The results show that while support for authoritarianism and negative evaluations of democracy are associated with party identification, issues of morality also impact identification.
Increased distanced between respondents and Concertación on the issues of abortion and samesex marriage is negatively and significantly associated with party identification with Concertación. In fact, when comparing the substantive effects of religious issues relative to the effects of regime preference, the effects of religious issues on identification with Concertación are at least comparable, and in some cases larger, than the effect of regime preference. A one standard deviation increase in regime preference (model 1) leads to a 9.74 percent decrease in the likelihood of identifying with Concertación. A two-unit change in each of the religious issue distance measures, collectively (which amounts to less than a one standard deviation increase in each) yields an 11.06 percent decrease in Concertación identification.
To what extent are these results dependent upon the use of Concertación perceptions and/or robust to using alternative party perceptions? Table S .2 compares the results using perceptions of Concertación from model 1 in Table S .1 with the perceptions of other parties by employing difference of deviances tests (insignificant differences indicate statistically equivalent model fit): the Alliance, PS, PPD, and PDC. The results show that perceptions of Concertación are equivalent to perceptions of PS and PPD in terms of model fit, while perceptions of the Alliance and PDC provide significantly weaker fit. The fact that party identification is determined more by perceptions of PS and PPD than PDC suggests that the increasingly polarized views of Concertación on issues of morality are being driven by the increasingly secular positions taken by the two socialist parties (documented in Table 1 in the main text), which we argue above have become the primary forces spurring changes in party perceptions.
The fact that perceptions of the Alliance matter less than perceptions of Concertación (as well as perceptions of PS and PPD) in shaping party identification provides further evidence of this point.
Table S.2 about here
To summarize the findings, this supplementary section provides clear evidence in favor of conflict extension (in addition to the evidence presented in Table 4 in the main text). Rather than displacing religious issues, issues of regime preference coexist alongside religious issues.
Instead of being displaced, the reason why religiosity was not significantly associated with party support in earlier periods appears to be due to the fact that the effect of religiosity is undergoing a realignment that is only beginning to surface. This realignment is being driven by the increasingly secular positions taken by Concertación, a supposition that is supported by the fact that perceptions of Concertación as a secular coalition are closely associated with perceptions of PS and PPD (the parties which have led the legislative efforts in Congress to promote a secular agenda).
On the second issue, we show that the age-related measures used in the main text are robust. Because age cohorts may differ in their responses to the Pinochet regime, we substituted the single age variable used in Table 3 with two variables measuring two distinct age cohorts.
One measures those reaching voting age in 1990 (Post-Pinochet era, the first year following the end of the Pinochet dictatorship) while another measures those reaching voting age prior to the 1973 coup (Pre-Pinochet era). The results of these re-estimated models are presented in Table   S Table 3 , the use of either the single age variable or the two cohort measures does not appear to affect the results: Table S .3 shows that religiosity remains significant in each model. Thus, the results in Table 3 appear robust to alternative controls dealing with age-related effects. 
